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Remedies for Employer Unfair Labor Practices
During Union Organizing Campaigns
For more than thirty years, the National Labor Relations Act' has
theoretically protected the right of workers to bargain collectively. But
because present law provides little prompt and effective control of the
tactics which both sides are tempted to use,2 union attempts to organize
non-union plants often become no-holds-barred dogfights between em-
ployer and union. Recent congressional hearings suggest that the die-
hard anti-union employer in particular takes advantage of inadequate
enforcement of existing standards of conduct.3
I. The Existing Legal Framework
Federal labor law attempts to regulate the union organizing cam-
paign in several ways. Most directly, federal law creates machinery for
"representation elections," by which a union is certified as the official
bargaining representative for a group of employees.4 The NLRB super-
vises these elections, counts the ballots, and guards against any iregu-
larities.5 An election may be held when at least 30 per cent of the em-
ployees in a given unit favor the union.6 A majority of the employees
in the unit must vote for the union in order for it to be certified.
7
The law attempts to protect the employee's freedom to vote for or
against union representation by prohibiting certain "unfair labor prac-
1. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1964).
2. See Karsh, Seidman & Lillienthal, The Union Organizer and his Tactics, 59 Amt.
J. SocloLooy 113 (1953); Roy, Unionization in the South, 15 LAD. L.J. 451 (1964); Zivallch,
The Process of Unionization in the South, 15 LAB. L.J. 468 (1964).
3. See Hearings on Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act by the
NLRB Before the Subcomm. on NLRB of the House Comm. on Education &r Labor, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1961) (the "Pucinski Report"); Hearings on H.R. 667, H.R. 976, H.R. 1134,
H.R. 1548, HR. 2038, H.R. 3355, H.R. 4278, H.R. 5918, H.R. 6080 Before the Special Sub.
comm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966);
Hearings on HR. 11725 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Education & Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968).
4. National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
5. Id.; see NLRB v. Schapiro & Whitehouse, Inc., 356 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1966);
Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942); NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324
(1946).
6. Since the Act does not define when a "substantial" number of employees wish to be
represented, it is within the NLRB's administrative discretion to define "substantial" to
mean 30 per cent. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 8309, 812 (1946).
7. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964); NLRB v. National
Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1954); Semi-Steel Casting Co. of St. Louis v. NLRB,
160 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 758 (1947).
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tices" which might prejudice or unduly pressure employees.8 An em-
ployer or union that uses inflammatory propaganda commits an unfair
labor practice,9 as does the employer who makes threats, 0 discharges
pro-union employees discriminatorily," interrogates employees un-
duly,u or grants special benefits on the eve of the electionY1
Remedies for unfair practices vary. The Board may issue cease and
desist orders;14 or if the practice is a discriminatory discharge, the Board
may reinstate the discharged employee with back pay.1 In addition, the
Board can invalidate election results. 6 A valid election precludes a sub-
sequent election for one year; 17 but if the Board finds that either party
has committed unfair labor practices which may have significantly
influenced the election result, it can set the election aside at the request
of the non-offending party and order another election.'8 Finally, under
8. National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 US.C. § 158 (1954).
9. General Indus. Flectronics Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1139 (1954); Sewell Mfg. Co., 133 N.L.
R.B. 66 (1962).
10. NLR.B v. Stanton Enterprises, Inc., 351 F.2d 261 (4th Cir. 1963); NLR B v. Morris
Fishman & Sons, Inc., 278 F.2d 792 (3rd Cir. 1960).
11. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964). 3.P. Stevens &
Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), enforced, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1967). See also J.P. Stevens a- Co.,
163 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (March 6, 1967), 64 L.R.R.M. 1289, enforced, 67 L.R.KM. 2055 (2d Cir.
1967).
12. Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954) (dismissing such union allega-
ion); Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964). modifying 144 N.L.RJI. 805 (1963)
(dismissing such a union allegation).
13. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 US. 405 (1954). May Dep't Stores Co. Y.
NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945).
14. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 US.C. § 160(c) (1954).
15. Id.; see Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 US. 177, 197-200 (1941) (computation of
back pay).
16. See, e.g., NLRB v. Realist, Inc., 328 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 US.
994 (1964).
17. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), 29 US.C. § 159(c) (1964).
18. NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket, 224 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
US. 914 (1955). See also Pollitt, NLRB Re-run Elections: A Study, 41 N.CJ. REv. 209
(1963). As a last resort, the Board has devised the infrequently used Joy Silh Mills order
to bargain with the union after the employer's unfair labor practices have dispated the
union's assumed or putative majority. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.
1950); Frank Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 US. 702 (1944). The Board in Bernel Foam Products
Co., Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964), increased this remedy's effectiveness by holding that a
union can petition for a bargaining order on the basis of Section 8(a)(5) violations, even
though it did not immediately file 8(a)(5) charges as to every alleed unfir practice which
the employer committed during the campaign. Bok notes that this remedy has been some-
what sparingly applied, perhaps with good reason. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign
Tactics in Representation Elections under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAv. L.
R-v. 38 (1964). He concludes that- (1) It would be inappropriate to issue a bargaining
order in the absence of some fairly clear evidence of a preexisting majority, unless the
unfair practices were quite serious and deliberate; (2) Even in these cases the remedy
should be used only where there is a reasonable possibility that the union vould have
ultimately prevailed, in the absence of the employer's unlawful acts; (3) Assuming that
these safeguards are observed, the bargaining order still should not be used as a matter
of course, to the detriment of informal methods of enforcement by which the employer
can be made to expunge the effects of his wrongful acts. Bok, supra, at 138-39. Comment,
Employer Pre-election Coerdom A Suggested Approach for Effective Remedial Action, 115
U. PA. L. Rav. 1111 (1967), points up some of the difficulties of ascertaining whether or not
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Section 10(c) of the NLRA, the Board has general power to "effectuate
the policies" of the NLRA, which it has relied on occasionally to create
new remedies guaranteeing fair representation elections.19
The existing legal framework for regulating organizing campaigns
has been sharply and widely criticized.20 It is acknowledged that union
organizing campaigns are frequently illegally disrupted by employers'
unfair labor practices.21 Most critics blame these recurring abuses on the
inadequate, slow, and unworkable remedies of present labor law.22
Existing remedies such as reinstatement with back pay for discrim-
the union would have attained a majority but for the employer's unfair labor practices.
This troublesome "but for" test is basic to the Joy Silk-.Bernel Foam bargaining order
remedy.
19. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964). The Board has cx-
perimented cautiously with several remedies under this section. For example, if the lines
of communication between union and employees are unfairly blocked, or if the Board de-
cides that it is necessary to "undo" the effect of an employer unfair labor practice, the
Board can give the union special access to employee ears.
The guilty employer can be required to allow a limited number of union "captive audi-
ence" speeches on company time. H.W. Elson Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 714 (1965), en.
forced as amended, 379 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1967). The union can be given limited access to
company property, such as the plant parking lot, for solicitation and distribution of union
literature. Marlene Indus. Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (July 3, 1967), 65 L.R.R.M. 1626,
Or the union may be given access to designated plant bulletin boards for as long as a year.
J.P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), enforced in part, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1967).
These remedies are of questionable value where serious coercive unfair labor practices by
the employer are involved. It must be clear to the employees, for example, that allowing
the union to make speeches does not bring discriminatorily discharged workers back to
work.
The effect of an employer's unfair practices can also be alleviated by extensively pub-
licizing Board rulings against the employer. In theory at least, knowledge that the employer
has been sanctioned assuages employee fears created by the unfair tactics. The Board's
Remedial Notice can be worded stiffly and clearly, to indicate to the employees that the
employer has been found guilty of an unfair labor practice. The Remedial Notice in
Bilyeu Motor Corp., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (Nov. 15, 1966), 63 L.R.R.M. 1471 is one Notice
which is not worded in equivocal legalese. The Remedial Notice can also be mailed to the
employees' homes at employer expense. J.P. Stevens & Co., supra. Or the employees can
be convened at department meetings, on company time, and the Remedial Notice can
there be read to them either by the employer (under Board compulsion) or by a Board
representative. Id. (The Court of Appeals refused to enforce the Board's order that It must
be the employer who reads the notice aloud.) This group of remedies is also grounded In
the notion of "undoing the effect" of the employer's unfair conduct. Where that conduct
has consisted of mere words or threats, the approach may be effective, But it would ,eem
insufficient to deal with employer actions such as discriminatory discharge.
20. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38 (1964), is the most thoughtful, oft.
quoted, and comprehensive article in the field. See also, Note, The Need for Creative
Orders under Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 112 U. PA. L. Rev. 69
(1964); Comment, Employer Pre-election Coercion: A Suggested Approach for Effective
Remedial Action, 115 U. PA. L. RExv. 1111 (1967).
21. See Hearings on H.R. 11725, supra note 3. See also remarks of Frank McCulloch,
Chairman of the NLRB, before the Federal Bar Association's 41st Annual Convention, £10
U.S.L.W. 2133 (Sept. 19, 1961): "Some employers, and some unions, repeatedly violate the
terms of our statute with knowledge that they are doing so. The number of unfair labor
practices, despite the widespread publicity, grows rather than diminishes."
22. See statement of James M. Pierce, Director of Southern Organization, Industrial




inatorily discharged workers have been justifiably called "too little and
too late" and "no more than a license fee for union busting."23
II. Current Proposals for Statutory Change
The need for imaginative and far-reaching reforms has been recog-
nized in many quarters,24 and many proposals have been advanced to
augment the NLRB's arsenal of remedies for unfair election practices.2
Several suggestions discussed in recent years would stiffen the penalties
for an employer who is guilty of unfair labor practices. Criminal prose-
cution of the guilty employer has often been considered.20 A related sug-
gestion, which has obvious analogues in other fields of public law (anti-
trust, for example), is to award punitive and general damages to a union
whose organizing drive was disrupted by an employer's unfair labor
practice.27 Or employers often found guilty of unfair labor practices
could be barred from government contracts for some period of time.23
Because the charge of "too late" usually accompanies the "too little"
indictment of existing Board remedies, there have been numerous pro-
posals to speed up the enforcement of NLRB orders against unfair labor
practices, not only in the context of organizing campaigns, but in all
cases before the Board.29 Other suggestions have been designed to reduce
23. McCulloch, supra note 21; Hearings on H.R. 11725, supra note 3, at 70, 254.
24. McCulloch, supra note 21; Hearings on H.R. 11725, supra note 3, at 118-19.
25. The NLRB has experimented with some new remedies, but in many cases the
Board has used these devices only on rare occasions. Even these remedies, horever, are
often inadequate. See examples discussed in note 19 supra.
26. See, e.g., Bok, supra note 20, at 125-26. B]ok notes numerous problems with criminal
penalties for employer unfair labor practices: (1) defining a standard of proof; (2) obtain-
ing jury convictions; (3) levying fines which cannot be passed on to consumers; (4) picking
the proper party for imprisonment; and (5) requiring lines high enough to have deterrent
effect.
27. Bok, supra note 20, at 127, points out that this remedy may have little deterrent
effect on large employers, may work inequitably against smaller employers, and raises some
problems of measuring damages.
28. Under this plan the "unfair" employer would be placed on a blacklist such as
exists for minimum wage violators under the Walsh-Healy and Bacon-Davis Acts. 40 U.S.C.
§ 276a-2 (1964); 41 U.S.C. § 37 (1964). This is a fairly drastic remedy and has yet to be
warmly received on Capitol Hill. If enforced, this of course would constitute the Draconian
approach toward government contractors. Toward others, it would be useless.
29. At least one writer has endorsed a more liberal use, especially for reinstatement in
discriminatory discharge cases, of the injunction authorized by Section 10() of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. See Comment, Employer Pre-election Coercion: A Suggested
Approach for Effective Remedial Action, supra note 20. But widespread use of the injunc-
tion in unfair labor practice cases would put prime responsibility for enforcing the labor
law in this area on the federal courts where Congress expressly did not put it. In addi-
tion, the NLRB seems hesitant to use the injunction because of its unsavory history. See
McCulloch, New Problems in the Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act:
The Taft-Hartley Injunction, 16 Sw. L.J. 82 (1962). In order to mitigate the harsh effects
of delay on an individual employee it has recently been proposed that an employee claim-
ing discriminatory discharge be allowed to borrow up to the amount of his weekly wages
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administrative delay in NLRB proceedings by delegating substantial
authority to trial examiners.3 0 In addition to expediting the Board's
procedures, some proposals would also inject the Board into the organiz-
ing process as an active overseer rather than the merely passive referee
it is today.81
Finally, to deal with outsiders who commit with impunity anti-union
acts which would be unfair labor practices if committed by the em-
ployer, unions have strongly urged Congress to amend the NLRA to
create "outsider unfair labor practices" and to broaden the scope of the
employer's liability for acts of third parties.
3 2
Many of the existing proposals to deal with organizing campaign vio-
lations do no more than tinker with a minor nut or bolt of a basically
inadequate machine. For instance, to bombard the workers with NLRB
announcements as to their rights, without providing more effective
machinery to enforce those rights, will do little to protect them from
employer violations. Other more vigorous proposals-such as the in-
creased use by the NLRB of federal court injunctions against unfair
from a federal revolving loan fund. He would be required to repay the loan when back
pay was either awarded or denied. See Section 3 of H.R. 11725, in Hearings on H, 11725,
supra note 3. Such a system would undoubtedly aid the employee, but it would do rela-
tively little to erase the direct effects of the discharge on the union's organizing campaign.
Discriminatory discharge of key unionists during a campaign would still weaken the
union's position and have its intimidating effect on other employees.
30. These proposals would make full review of the trial examiner's decision purely
discretionary with the Board; if the Board refused to review the decision, the ordinary
enforcement procedures would go into effect immediately. See Reorganization Plait No.
of 1961, which was defeated in the House of Representatives, 107 CoNc. REc. $1,069-78
(daily ed. July 20, 1961). Section I of H.R. 11725 offers essentially the same solution,
31. To keep the Regional Office abreast of campaign tactics, and in the hope of mod.
erating the claims and charges of campaign literature, the Board might require the filing
of copies of all campaign literature released by both sides with the Regional Director. See
Note, The Need for Creative Orders under Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, supra note 20, at 82. Or a representative of the Regional Office might make frequent
"observation" visits to the plant during the organizing campaign. Id. A further proposal
for rectifying campaign abuses is a labor version of the "Oregon pamphlet plan." See Note,
Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation Campaigns,
72 YALE L.J. 1243 (1963). Claims of the opposing parties to the campaign would be com-
piled into a pamphlet. Distribution of that pamphlet to the employees would allow them
to see opposing arguments in sharp juxtaposition. Id. 1261-62. All of the proposals for
increased Board supervision of the campaign are attractive, but one may well doubt their
effectiveness if the Board has no means of effectively enforcing the declared standards of
conduct for organizing campaigns.
32. The unions strongly urge such amendments. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of
America, "The Hollow Promise" (1967) (copy on file at the Yale Law Journal) (Illusttated
tract on the difficulties in the Southern textile industry). But more neutral proponents of
such amendments concede that they may be unworkable. See supplemental statement of
Congressman Frank Thompson, Jr. (D.N.J.), one such proponent:
There certainly are administrative problems in these proposals. What would the Labor
Board do if it were the Mayor who urged an anti-union vote? A newspaper editor?
A minister from the pulpit? And suppose the local police harassed the union organizer
pursuant to a city ordinance? Against whom would the charge be directed?
Hearings on H.R. 667, supra note 3, at 87.
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labor practices3--might be reasonably effective if a great deal more
NLRB and federal court time were devoted to policing the organizing
campaign. But for the Board and the courts to enforce promptly and
effectively all present standards in all plants across the country would
involve unacceptably high costs.
A better solution would concentrate the limited resources of the
NLRB enforcement apparatus on preventing those unfair labor prac-
tices which are most likely to undermine the workers' freedom of choice
on the representation issue. Such a proposal must go beyond after-the-
fact remedies and make discriminatory discharge, the employers' most
effective union-breaking weapon, impossible at the outset. One feasible
way of concentrating NLRB resources would be to limit special NLRB
attention at a plant to a short period and to provide during that period
a speedy preventive remedy for alleged discriminatory discharges. This
Note outlines how such a concentration of resources could be achieved
through registering and limiting union organizing campaigns and re-
stricting employer discharges during the short period of the registered
campaign.
III. A New Approach: The Registered Organizing Campaign
The approach proposed here involves registering the organizing cam-
paign under the aegis of the NLRB and thus bringing the campaign
into the open where rules can more easily be enforced against both sides.
For the employees, more intensive NLRB supervision of a union's
organizing campaign would provide some education about employee
rights under the National Labor Relations Act34 and effective protec-
tion from discriminatory discharges by the employer. For the employer,
registration would offer a time limit for the campaign and a subsequent
period of freedom from organizing in the event the workers voted not
to unionize.35
33. See note 29 supra.
34. Under present law, the NLRB has no responsibility to educate workers about their
rights under the law. This task is left primarily to the union while management pre-
sumably reminds workers of their right to remain unorganized. However, an employer's
explanation of federal law to his employees may be so biased as to be a threat, and thus
constitute grounds for setting aside an election which the union lost. See, e.g., Dal-Tem
Optical Co., 137 N.LR.B. 1782 (1962). Because they get no clear statement of the law from
any neutral party, workers are often unsure or ignorant of their legal rights and duties.
See generally testimony of union officials in Hearings on H.R. 11725, supra note 3, at 89,
120-21, 125 166, 268.
35. Presently, the law sets no time limit on the duration of a union's organizing cam-
paign, nor is there a prohibition on union organizing and agitation even when the union
has lost a valid election and hence cannot obtain another election for a year. The National
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A. Registering the Campaign
Registration with the Regional Office of the NLRB would mark the
formal start of a short organizing campaign period and would bring into
operation the protections for the registration period.' Normally the
advantages of these protections would impel the union to seek the reg-
istration umbrella once it decides to conduct a campaign. But it would
probably be unwise to require that a union register its campaign as
soon as the union contacts the first employee. To void a successful cam-
paign because of pre-registration campaigning would seem too harsh a
sanction, and any lesser penalty would probably be ineffective to stop
unregistered "undercover" campaigning. Moreover, it is probably de-
sirable to register and control only union organizing campaigns with
some chance of success. Nonetheless, since a union would have the power
to register at any time, the employer should also be able to register an
organizing campaign at his plant. In view of the moratorium provisions
to be discussed below, registration should not be granted at the em-
ployer's request unless he can show that some organizing activity has
been going on at his plant.
B. Time Limit and Moratorium
The prime objective of the registration scheme is to concentrate in a
short period the frenzy of organization and to subject that frenzy to
certain checks and controls necessary to keep the campaign above a
minimal level of rationality. To achieve this objective, the registered
campaign period must be as short as possible and still allow the em-
ployees adequate time to consider their alternatives. A period of from
two to four weeks would probably be appropriate for most bargaining
campaigns.
At the end of the short period set for the registered campaign, the
union would be required to demonstrate support or get out of the plant.
Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3), prohibits only elections for a year after
a valid election. Nothing prevents the union from campaigning during the year for rupport
in a subsequent election.
36. The act of registering should bring the proposed safeguards into effect at once; but
registration should be provisional until an NLRB Regional Director determines that the
union has chosen an appropriate bargaining unit to try to organize. A finding that the
unit is not appropriate should terminate the registration; however, unless the union was
acting in bad faith in the first registration, such termination should not preclude a new
registration for a different, and this time "appropriate," bargaining unit. The current
statutory provisions on the subject of the determination of the appropriate bargaining unit
are National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964) (authorizing the NLRB
to determine the appropriate bargaining unit) and National Labor Relations Act § 3(b),
29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964) (authorizing delegation to regional directors of NLRB powers to
determine appropriate bargaining unit; such a delegation has been effccted, see 29 C.F.R.
§ 101,21(a)).
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If the union had obtained support from a certain minimum percentage
of the employees (such as 30 per cent under present law),3 7 an NLR1B-
supervised representation election should be held as soon thereafter as
possible.
To achieve the objective of concentrating a union organizing cam-
paign in a short period, the campaign would also have to preclude
another election for a substantial period. Under present law, 33 if the
union obtained and won an election it would be the sole bargaining
agent for at least a year. Likewise, if the union failed to obtain sufficient
support to compel an election and then to win, union organizing cam-
paigns and petitions for elections would also be prohibited for a year.
Since unions could attack the employer with one registered campaign
after another if only the campaigning union were barred by a recent
unsuccessful campaign, an unsuccessful organizing campaign by one
union would probably have to bar organizing activities by all unions
for the prescribed period.39
As an incentive for employer compliance with NLRB rules, the bar
to subsequent organizing campaigns should not apply if the employer
is found guilty of serious Labor Act violations.
The time limit and moratorium should call a halt to endless cam-
paigns of attrition in which the union and employer are incessantly at
loggerheads. Instead, one short regulated campaign would be followed
by either recognition of the union or a year-long moratorium on the
contest.
C. Apprising Employer and Employees of Their Rights and Duties
Once a campaign is registered, the NLRB should apprise both the
employer and his employees of their rights and duties under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. The practical fundamentals of labor law
could be communicated to management during a personal visit by one
or more representatives of the Regional Office while employees could
be informed of their rights at one or more meetings conducted by
NLRB representatives. Ideally the Board should prepare and distribute
37. See note 6 supra.
38. Cf. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954). In the absence of unusual drum-
stances, a union's majority status must be honored for one year follo ing certification.
39. If such a rule adopted, other unions should be allowed to join a registered cam.
paign either in concert with or in competition with the registering union. The union which
registered the campaign would have a significant advantage over competing unions since
it would have chosen the time for the campaign and would be prepared to commit its
organizing resources. Since the campaign period is very short, others unions may find it
difficult to gear up their own campaigns. It may be desirable, however, to give some ad-
vantage to the union which first decides to organize a plant.
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to management and employees a pamphlet setting forth in simple terms
the basic rights and duties of employees, employer, and union, and des-
cribing the avenues of redress open to each for violations of their rights.
As first steps toward rationalizing the organizational campaign, both
the presence of a government representative at an early stage and the
distribution to all parties of a dear, authoritative announcement of the
rules of the organizing game would have great value in exerting pres-
sure for a clean campaign.
D. Employee Tenure During the Organizing Campaign
To remove the employer's chief unlawful weapon against an orga-
nizing union-the discharge for union activity-employees should be
given a form of tenure during both the organizing campaign and the
representation election campaign that follows. During the campaigns,
the employer should have the right to discharge employees only after
(1) giving prior notice, (2) stating in writing and under oath the reason
for the discharge, and (3) if challenged, satisfying an NLRB trial exam-
iner that the discharge was not a discriminatory anti-union move. En-
forcement of these procedural requirements against the employer ought
to be swift and severe since compliance with the procedures is easy for
the employer, easy to prove or disprove, and important to the operation
of the whole registration scheme. Criminal penalties and compensatory
damages coupled with substantial punitive damages to the employee
would be effective sanctions for breach of any of the three requirements.
Once the employer has given notice, declared the reason for the dis-
charge under oath, and been challenged by the union, the dispute must
be resolved quickly and authoritatively; in addition, any possible ad-
verse effect of the determination process on the party found to be in
the right must be minimized. For example, a Regional Office official
could make an initial determination solely on the basis of affidavits from
the employer, employee, and union as to whether the proposed dis.
charge was an act of anti-union discrimination. If the prior notice of
discharge had to be filed a week or so before the discharge, the decision
on the affidavits could be made prior to the effective date of the dis-
charge.
If either the union or employer challenged the initial finding, an ex-
pedited hearing could be held before a trial examiner. Pending the
hearing and decision, the discharge should be suspended and the em-
ployee should be allowed to remain on the job as living proof that the
organizing campaign rules are being enforced by the NLRB. At the
hearing, the employer should have the burden of showing absence of
1W8
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anti-union motivation in the disputed discharge.4 0 Because the orga-
nizing campaign should not be dragged out while further appeals are
taken, the decision after the expedited hearing should be final for pur-
poses of the organizing campaign.41 If the union wins, the discharge
should be quashed; and if the employer wins, the union should not
later be allowed to claim that the coercive effect of this discharge ruined
the election. There would seem to be no reason, however, to preclude
either the discharged employee or the employer from appealing in the
normal wayl a decision on the affidavits or after an expedited hearing,
so long as the decision quashing or allowing the discharge was allowed
to stand until reversed on appeal.
E. Possible Further Regulation of the Registered Campaign
A registered organizing campaign might be the object of other regu-
lations and requirements in addition to the vital safeguards against
discriminatory discharges. For example, the law might require that
certain economic claims made by the employer or the union during the
campaign be supported with proof by the party making the claim.43
Registration would also provide an appropriate point to apply the re-
cently developed rule that the employer must give the union a list of
employees' names and addresses at a reasonable time before a repre-
sentation election.4
If the close NLRB supervision and the employee tenure provisions
reduced the psychological power of the employer over his employees
sufficiently, organizational picketing by the union might be prohibited
40. Such a showing would usually involve proof of the existence of a valid justification
for the discharge (e.g., economic pressure on the employer to reduce the sie of the work
force or serious breach of discipline by the employee) plus proof that the discharge vas
consistent with discharge practices before the union campaign began.
41. To promote certainty, the occurrence of an "allowed" discharge, even if later shown
to have been discriminatory, should not be held to invalidate the results of the organizing
campaign and following election.
42. National Labor Relations Act §§ 10(c) (enforcement), 10() (review); 29 US.C.
§§ 160(e)-(f) (1964); see Ball v. NLRB, 299 F.2d 683, cert. denied, 369 US. 838 (1962) (com-
paring 10(e) and 10(f) as to choice of forum).
43. The employer may now be required to substantiate claims that he cannot pay
higher wages, in a post-certification bargaining situation. NLR.B v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149 (1956). Extending this rule to the period of the registered organizing campaign
would give the employees more information on which to base a rational decision. This
would not necessarily work to the union's advantage in all cases. As the Court pointed
out in Truitt, "Claims for increased wages have sometimes been abandoned because of an
employer's unsatisfactory business conditions. Employees have even voted to accept wage
decreases because of such conditions." 351 US. at 152. A union organizing campaign, by
the same logic, might be slowed down by disclosure of the employers precarious economic
position.
44. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). The Fourth Circuit recently
approved the obtaining of such a list by subpoena. Hanes Hosiery Division, 65 L.R.LM.
2264 (4th Cir. 1967).
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as a further step to rationalizing the organizing campaign.45 Such pick-
eting today serves as an important union counter-weapon to the various
employer strong-arm tactics which are outlawed more in theory than
in fact;46 but with a registered campaign the picketing might become an
unnecessary and undesirable relic of a more barbaric and less rational
era in labor relations.
45. Primary picketing is now prohibited only after a valid election, and in certain
other situations. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1964). See Weltzer, Organizational Picketing and
the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 80 U. CHi. L. REv. 78 (1962).
46. Professor Cox offers this justification for allowing picketing under the present law
of organizing campaigns:
Concerted activities which demonstrate the power of the union may be an important
part of the electioneering not so much because of economic coercion but because the
publicity and demonstration of the union's power go far to offset hitherto unorganized
employees' fear of running counter to the employer's wishes, a fear often kept alive
and strengthened by his artful use of his freedom of expression. In other words, the
expression of opinion which follows a campaign in which unions are free to picket
may be more reliable than a poll without competing pressures.
Cox, Some Current Problems in Labor Law: An Appraisal, 35 L.R.R.M. 48, 56 (1954) (ad.
dress to the Conference on Labor Law held in Los Angeles, California, on December 9, in
connection with the 1954 Convention of the CIO).
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